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Abstract
Recent work has attempted to use whole-genome sequence data from pathogens to
reconstruct the transmission trees linking infectors and infectees in outbreaks. However,
transmission trees from one outbreak do not generalize to future outbreaks.
Reconstruction of transmission trees is most useful to public health if it leads to
generalizable scientific insights about disease transmission. In a survival analysis
framework, estimation of transmission parameters is based on sums or averages over the
possible transmission trees. A phylogeny can increase the precision of these estimates by
providing partial information about who infected whom. The leaves of the phylogeny
represent sampled pathogens, which have known hosts. The interior nodes represent
common ancestors of sampled pathogens, which have unknown hosts. Starting from
assumptions about disease biology and epidemiologic study design, we prove that there
is a one-to-one correspondence between the possible assignments of interior node hosts
and the transmission trees simultaneously consistent with the phylogeny and the
epidemiologic data on person, place, and time. We develop algorithms to enumerate
these transmission trees and show these can be used to calculate likelihoods that
incorporate both epidemiologic data and a phylogeny. A simulation study confirms that
this leads to more efficient estimates of hazard ratios for infectiousness and baseline
hazards of infectious contact, and we use these methods to analyze data from a
foot-and-mouth disease virus outbreak in the United Kingdom in 2001. These results
demonstrate the importance of data on individuals who escape infection, which is often
overlooked. The combination of survival analysis and algorithms linking phylogenies to
transmission trees is a rigorous but flexible statistical foundation for molecular
infectious disease epidemiology.
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Author Summary
Recent work has attempted to use whole-genome sequence data from pathogens to
reconstruct the transmission trees linking infectors and infectees in outbreaks. However,
transmission trees from one outbreak do not generalize to future outbreaks.
Reconstruction of transmission trees is most useful to public health if it leads to
generalizable scientific insights about disease transmission. Accurate estimates of
transmission parameters can help identify risk factors for transmission and aid the
design and evaluation of public health interventions for emerging infections. Using
statistical methods for time-to-event data (survival analysis), estimation of transmission
parameters is based on sums or averages over the possible transmission trees. By
providing partial information about who infected whom, a pathogen phylogeny can
reduce the set of possible transmission trees and increase the precision of transmission
parameter estimates. We derive algorithms that enumerate the transmission trees
consistent with a pathogen phylogeny and epidemiologic data, show how to calculate
likelihoods for transmission data with a phylogeny, and apply these methods to a foot
and mouth disease outbreak in the United Kingdom in 2001. These methods will allow
pathogen genetic sequences to be incorporated into the analysis of outbreak
investigations, vaccine trials, and other studies of infectious disease transmission.
Introduction
Genetic sequences from pathogen samples are an increasingly important source of
information in infectious disease epidemiology. The structure of a pathogen phylogeny
can reflect immunological strain selection, epidemic dynamics, and patterns of spatial
spread [1–3]. Phylogenies linking pathogen genetic sequences sampled at known times
and places have been used to investigate the origins and spread of HIV-1 [4, 5] and the
global circulation of seasonal influenza [6–9]. Using coalescent models, phylogenies can
be used to reconstruct the history of effective viral population sizes [10] or estimate
basic reproductive numbers (R0) [11]. These methods can reveal details of the
large-scale spread of infection that would be difficult or impossible to detect otherwise.
For example, Biek et al. [12] showed that the invasion of the eastern United States by a
raccoon-specific rabies virus occurred in seven distinct clades (each representing a
different direction of spread from the epizootic origin in West Virginia) and three waves
of expansion (1987–1993, 1986–1990, and 1990–1992).
When epidemic models are integrated with population genetics, several
complications arise in the interpretation of the effective number of infections and the
scaling of time [13–15]. Recently, methods have been developed that use phylogenetic
trees to make inferences about the prevalence of infection over time while accounting for
epidemic dynamics [13,16], and some of these can incorporate time series data on the
number of cases [17,18]. These phylodynamic methods generally assume a sparse
sample of pathogen genetic sequences from a large infected population. In this paper,
we consider the use of densely-sampled pathogen genetic sequences to make inferences
about person-to-person transmission.
Reconstructing transmission trees with genetic sequences
The earliest use of phylogenetics in infectious disease epidemiology was to confirm or
rule out a suspected source of the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV). Phylogenetic
analyses were used to confirm that five HIV patients were infected at a dental practice
in Florida between 1987 and 1989 [19] and to rule out infection of a Baltimore patient
in 1985 by an HIV-positive surgeon [20]. A more ambitious use of phylogenetics is to
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reconstruct a transmission tree, which is a directed graph with an edge from node i to
node j if person i infected person j. An analysis by Leitner et al. [21, 22] of an HIV-1
transmission cluster in Sweden from the early 1980s compared reconstructed phylogenies
based on HIV genetic sequences to a true phylogeny based on the known transmission
tree, times of transmission, and times of sequence sampling. The reconstructed
phylogenies accurately reflected the topology of the true phylogeny, and the accuracy
increased when sequences from different regions of the HIV genome were combined.
The increasing availability of whole-genome sequence data has renewed interest in
combining pathogen genetic sequence data with epidemiologic data to reconstruct
transmission trees. One approach to this problem is to reconstruct the transmission tree
using genetic distances. Spada et al. [23] reconstructed the transmission tree linking five
children infected with hepatitis C virus (HCV) by finding the spanning tree linking the
HCV genetic sequences that minimized the sum of the genetic distances across its edges,
excluding edges inconsistent with the epidemiologic data. The SeqTrack algorithm of
Jombart et al. [24] generalizes this approach. It constructs a transmission tree by
finding the spanning tree linking the sampled sequences that minimizes (or maximizes)
a set of edge weights. Snitkin et al. [25] used this algorithm to investigate a 2011
outbreak of carbapenem-resistant Klebsiella pneumoniae in the NIH Clinical Center,
penalizing edges with large genetic distances, between patients who did not overlap in
the same ward, or that required a long silent colonization. Wertheim et al. [26]
constructed a network among HIV patients in San Diego by linking individuals whose
sequences were < 1% distant. This was used to estimate community-level effects of HIV
prevention and treatment.
A second approach to transmission tree reconstruction is to weight possible
infector-infectee links using a pseudolikelihood based on genetic and epidemiologic data.
Ypma et al. [27] analyzed a 2003 influenza A(H7N7) outbreak among poultry farms in
the Netherlands by combining data on the times of infection and culling at each farm,
the distances between the farms, and RNA consensus sequences. The weight of each
possible transmission link was the product of components based on temporal,
geographic, and genetic data. The weight of a complete transmission tree was the
product of the edge weights. The R package outbreaker implements an extension of this
approach that allows multiple introductions of infection and unobserved cases [28]. Like
the spanning tree methods above, these methods model pathogen evolution as a process
that occurs at the moment of transmission. Morelli et al. [29] proposed a variation of
these methods that allows within-host pathogen evolution by incorporating the times of
infection and observation into the likelihood component for the genetic sequence data.
A third approach is to reconstruct the transmission tree by combining a phylogeny
with epidemiologic data, which was first done by Cottam et al. [30, 31] in an
investigation of a 2001 foot-and-mouth disease virus (FMDV) outbreak among farms in
the United Kingdom (UK). The phylogeny and the transmission tree were linked by
considering possible locations of the most recent common ancestors (MRCAs) of viruses
sampled from the farms. The probability pij that farm i infected farm j was calculated
using epidemiologic data on the oldest detected FMDV lesion and the dates of sampling
and culling on each farm. The weight of each possible transmission network was
proportional to the product of the pij for all edges i→ j. Similar methods were used to
track farm-to-farm spread of a 2007 FMDV outbreak [32]. Gardy et al. [33] combined
social network analysis with a phylogeny based on whole-genome sequences to construct
a transmission tree for a tuberculosis outbreak in British Columbia. Didelot et al. used
the time of the most recent common ancestor (TMRCA) to identify possible
person-to-person transmission events in studies of Clostridium difficile transmission in
the UK [34] and Helicobacter pylori transmission in South Africa [35]. In a study of
Mycobacterium tuberculosis transmission in the Netherlands, Bryant et al. [36] ruled out
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transmission between individuals whose samples did not share a parent in the phylogeny.
Recent research has identified problems with using genetic sequence data to
reconstruct transmission trees. Simulations by Worby et al. [37, 38] found that pairwise
genetic distances cannot reliably identify sources of infection. Methods based on
phylogenies often underestimate the complexity of the relationship between the
phylogenetic and transmission trees. Branching events in a phylogeny do not necessarily
correspond to transmissions, and the topology of the phylogenetic tree need not be the
same as the topology of the transmission tree [39–41]. These differences are especially
important for diseases with significant within-host pathogen diversity and long latent or
infectious periods [41,42].
Ypma et al. [40] and Didelot et al. [42] have developed Bayesian methods that
enforce consistency between phylogenetic and transmission trees in Markov chain Monte
Carlo (MCMC) iterations. More recently, Lau et al. [43] have outlined a Bayesian
integration of epidemiologic and genetic sequence data that uses likelihoods based on
survival analysis, but their approach does not use pathogen phylogenies directly,
assuming that a single dominant lineage within each host can be transmitted. Here, we
build a systematic understanding of the relationship between pathogen phylogenies and
transmission trees under much weaker assumptions about within-host evolution,
allowing the incorporation of genetic sequence data into frequentist and Bayesian
survival analysis of infectious disease transmission data.
Transmission trees and public health
Reconstruction of transmission trees is most useful to public health if it leads to
generalizable scientific insights about disease transmission. The transmission tree from
one outbreak does not generalize to future outbreaks, but a phylogeny provides partial
information about who-infected-whom. Survival analysis provides a rigorous but flexible
statistical framework for infectious disease transmission data that explicitly links
parameter estimation to the set of possible transmission trees [44–46]. In this
framework, estimates of transmission parameters such as covariate effects on
infectiousness and susceptibility and evolution of infectiousness over time in infectious
individuals are based on sums or averages over all possible transmission trees. Since a
phylogeny linking pathogen samples from infected individuals constrains the set of
possible transmission trees, pathogen genetic sequence data can be combined with
epidemiologic data to obtain more efficient estimates of transmission parameters.
Methods
General stochastic S(E)IR model
At any time, each individual i ∈ {1, . . . , n} is in one of four states: susceptible (S),
exposed (E), infectious (I), or removed (R). Person i moves from S to E at his or her
infection time ti, with ti =∞ if i is never infected. After infection, i has a latent period
of length εi during which he or she is infected but not infectious. At time ti + εi, i
moves from E to I, beginning an infectious period of length ιi. At time ti + εi + ιi, i
moves from I to R, where he or she can no longer infect others or be infected. The latent
period εi is a nonnegative random variable, the infectious period ιi is a strictly positive
random variable, and both have finite mean and variance. If person i is infected, the
time elapsed since the onset of infectiousness at time ti + εi is the infectious age of i.
After becoming infectious at time ti + εi, person i makes infectious contact with
j 6= i at time tij = ti + εi + τ∗ij . We define infectious contact to be sufficient to cause
infection in a susceptible person, so tj ≤ tij . The infectious contact interval τ∗ij is a
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strictly positive random variable with τ∗ij =∞ if infectious contact never occurs. Since
infectious contact must occur while i is infectious or never, τ∗ij ∈ (0, ιi] or τ∗ij =∞.
For each ordered pair ij, let Cij = 1 if infectious contact from i to j is possible and
Cij = 0 otherwise. For example, the Cij could be the entries in the adjacency matrix for
a contact network. However, we do not require that Cij = Cji. We assume the
infectious contact interval τ∗ij is generated in the following way: A contact interval τij is
drawn from a distribution with hazard function hij(τ). If τij ≤ ιi and Cij = 1, then
τ∗ij = τij . Otherwise, τ
∗
ij =∞.
Epidemiologic data Our epidemiologic data contain the times of all S→ E
(infection), E→ I (infectiousness onset), and I→ R (removal) transitions in the
population between time 0 and time T . For all ordered pairs ij in which i is infected,
we observe Cij .
An exogenous infection occurs when an individual is infected from a source outside
the observed population. An endogenous infection occurs when an individual is infected
from within the observed population. For each endogenous infection j, let vj denote the
index of his or her infector. Let vj = 0 if j is an exogenous infection and vj =∞ if j is
not infected. Let Vj denote the set of possible vj <∞, which we call the infectious set
of j. If j is not infected, let Vj = ∅ (the empty set).
The transmission tree is the directed network with an edge from vj to j for each
infected j. It is a directed tree rooted at node 0, and it can be represented by a vector
v = (v1, . . . , vn). Let V denote the set of all possible v consistent with the observed
data. A v ∈ V can be generated by choosing a vj ∈ Vj for each infected j, but we do
not assume that all possible transmission trees have the same probability.
Survival analysis of transmission data
Survival analysis of infectious disease transmission data can be viewed as a
generalization of discrete-time chain binomial models [47] to continuous time, and it
includes parametric methods [44], nonparametric methods [45], and semiparametric
relative-risk regression models [46]. For simplicity, we use parametric methods and
assume that exogenous infections are known. Let the hazard of infectious contact from i
to j at time τ after the onset of infectiousness in i be
hij(τ) = exp
(
β>0 Xij(τ)
)
h0(τ), (1)
where β0 is an unknown coefficient vector, Xij(τ) is a covariate vector, and h0(τ) is a
baseline hazard function. The vector Xij(τ) can include individual-level covariates
affecting the infectiousness of i or the susceptibility of j as well as pairwise covariates
(e.g., membership in the same household). The coefficient vector β0 captures covariate
effects on the hazard of transmission, and the baseline hazard function h0(τ) captures
the evolution of infectiousness over time in infectious individuals.
We assume that τij can be observed only if j is infected by i at time ti + εi + τij .
The contact interval τij will be unobserved if i recovers from infectiousness before
making infectious contact with j, if j is infected by a someone other than i, or if
observation of j has stopped. Let Ii(τ) = 1τ∈(0,ιi] be a left-continuous process
indicating whether i remains infectious at infectious age τ . Let Sij(τ) = 1ti+εi+τ≤tj be
a left-continuous process indicating whether j remains susceptible when i reaches
infectious age τ . Assume that the population is under observation until a stopping time
T and let Oij(τ) = 1ti+εi+τ≤T be a left-continuous process indicating whether j is
under observation when i reaches infectious age τ . Then
Yij(τ) = CijIi(τ)Sij(τ)Oij(τ) (2)
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is a left-continuous process indicating whether infectious contact from i to j can be
observed at infectious age τ of i. The assumptions above ensure that censoring of τij is
independent for all ij, and they can be relaxed if independent censoring is preserved.
Let θ be a parameter vector for a family of hazard functions h(τ,θ) such that
h0(τ) = h(τ,θ0) for an unknown θ0. To allow maximum likelihood estimation, we
assume that h(τ,θ) has continuous second derivatives with respect to θ. Let
hij(τ,β,θ) = exp
(
β>Xij(τ)
)
h(τ,θ). (3)
Let Wj = {i : ti + εi < tj and Cij = 1} denote the set of all infectious individuals to
whom j was exposed while susceptible, which we call the exposure set of j. When we
observe who-infected-whom (i.e., v is known), the likelihood is
Lv(β,θ) =
n∏
j=1
[
hvjj(tj − tvj − εvj ,β,θ)1vj 6∈{0,∞}
∏
i∈Wj
e−
∫ ιi
0 hij(τ,β,θ)Yij(τ) dτ
]
. (4)
The hazard terms depend on v, but the survival terms do not [44].
When we do not observe who-infected-whom, the likelihood is a sum over all possible
transmission trees: L(β,θ) =
∑
v∈V Lv(β,θ) [44]. Each v ∈ V can be generated by
choosing a vj ∈ Vj for each endogenous infection j. Given the epidemiologic data, each
vj can be chosen independently [48]. This leads to the sum-product factorization
L(β,θ) =
n∏
j=1
[(∑
i∈Vj
hij(tj − ti − εi,β,θ)
)1vj 6∈{0,∞} ∏
i∈Wj
e−
∫ ιi
0 hij(τ,β,θ)Yij(τ) dτ
]
. (5)
The probability of a particular transmission tree v is
Pr(v|β,θ) = Lv(β,θ)
L(β,θ)
=
∏
j:vj 6∈{0,∞}
hvjj(tj − tvj − εvj ,β,θ)∑
i∈Vj hij(tj − ti − εi,β,θ)
, (6)
and Lv(β,θ) = Pr(v|β,θ)L(β,θ). In this framework, estimation of (β, θ), and the
probabilities of possible transmission trees is simultaneous. An interesting special case is
when hij(τ,β,θ) = λ for all ij. Then Pr(v|β,θ) does not depend on λ, so the
transmission tree is an ancillary statistic [44].
Likelihood calculation with a phylogeny Let Φ denote a pathogen phylogeny, v
denote a transmission tree, and Epi denote the epidemiologic data. Let the function
Pr(·) denote probabilities or probability densities as necessary, and let V denote the set
of transmission trees consistent with both Φ and Epi. Then the likelihood for β is
Pr(Φ, Epi|β,θ) =
∑
v∈V
Pr(v,Φ, Epi|β,θ) =
∑
v∈V
Pr(Φ|v, Epi) Pr(v, Epi|β,θ). (7)
The factor Pr(v, Epi|β,θ) is the likelihood in equation (4). The factor Pr(Φ|v, Epi)
depends on within-host pathogen evolution and could incorporate genetic distances and
branching times, allowing the joint estimation of between-host transmission parameters
and within-host evolutionary parameters. For example, within-host coalescent models
were used by Ypma et al. [40] and Didelot et al. [42]. The probability of a given
transmission tree v is
Pr(v|β,θ,Φ) = Pr(Φ|v, Epi) Pr(v, Epi|β,θ)
Pr(Φ, Epi|β,θ) . (8)
As before, estimation of (β,θ) and the probabilities of different transmission trees is
simultaneous. By providing partial information about who-infected-whom, a phylogeny
can increase the precision of transmission parameter estimates.
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Phylogenies and transmission trees
The relationship between phylogenies and transmission trees we develop here is similar
to the approach taken by Cottam et al. [31] who linked phylogenetic and transmission
trees via the locations of common ancestors. It is logically equivalent to the approaches
of Ypma et al. [40] who joined the within-host phylogenies of infectors and infectees into
a single phylogeny, Didelot et al. [42] who colored lineages in the phylogeny with a
unique color for each individual, and Hall and Rambaut [49] who represented
transmission trees as partitions of phylogenies. We begin with these assumptions:
1. Each individual is infected at most once.
2. Each infection is initiated by a single pathogen. Following infection, within-host
pathogen evolution occurs and the evolved pathogens are transmitted to others.
3. The order in which infections (or onsets of infectiousness) occurred is known.
4. We have at least one pathogen sequence from each infected individual, and these
sequences are linked in a rooted phylogeny. The root of this phylogeny has a
parent node r0.
5. Each node in the phylogeny represents a pathogen that had a host, which is also
the “host” of the node. A parent-child relationship between nodes with different
hosts represents a direct transmission of infection from the host of the parent to
the host of the child. The node r0 has a host outside the observed population.
The first two assumptions concern the biology of disease. The last three assumptions
concern the resolution of the epidemiologic data, which can be controlled through study
design. Initially, we use only the topology of the pathogen phylogeny to infer the set of
possible transmission trees. Later, we consider how branching times at interior nodes
further restrict the set of possible transmission trees.
Transmission trees and interior node hosts The leaves (tips) of the phylogenetic
tree represent sampled pathogens. Each interior node represents a most recent common
ancestor (MRCA) of two or more sampled pathogens. Let host(x) be the host of the
pathogen represented by node x in the phylogeny. If x is a leaf, then host(x) is known.
If x had a host outside the observed population, let host(x) = 0. In particular,
host(r0) = 0. The hosts of all other interior nodes are unknown.
Lemma 1. The nodes hosted by an infected individual form a subtree of the
phylogenetic tree.
Proof. See S1 Appendix.
Theorem 1. A phylogeny with known interior node hosts implies a unique
transmission tree.
Proof. See S1 Appendix.
Lemma 1 applies to nodes hosted by infected individuals in the observed population,
not to the set of nodes hosted by 0 (i.e., hosts outside the observed population). In the
rest of this section, we assume that the set of nodes hosted by 0 is a tree rooted at r0.
In practice, this restricts the study design. For example, this assumption would be
violated if we observed only individuals A and C in a household where A was the index
case and there was a chain of transmission A→ B → C. The results of this section can
be generalized to phylogenies where the set of nodes hosted by 0 is a union of subtrees
as long as each subtree has a known root node. In this case, the phylogeny can split into
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Figure 1. Two possible transmission trees and three possible pathogen
phylogenies for a household outbreak. A, B, and C were infected in alphabetical
order such that their infectious sets are VA = {0}, VB = {A}, and VC = {A,B}. We
have a single pathogen sequence from each person. The top shows the two possible
transmission trees within the household: either A infected B and B infected C (left) or
A infected B and C (right). The bottom shows the three rooted, bifurcating phylogenies
linking pathogen sequences from A, B, and C. In each phylogeny, the possible hosts are
written underneath each interior node and arrows indicate how each assignment of
interior node hosts determines a transmission tree via Assumption 5.
disjoint pieces by erasing the incoming edge to each root of a subtree hosted by 0. Each
of these pieces can be treated as a separate phylogeny in which the nodes hosted by 0
form a subtree.
An assignment of interior node hosts consistent with Lemma 1 will produce at most
one transmission tree. A possible assignment of interior node hosts is an assignment
consistent with Lemma 1 that produces a transmission tree consistent with the
epidemiologic data. A possible transmission tree is a transmission tree consistent with
the epidemiologic data that can be produced by at least one assignment of interior node
hosts consistent with Lemma 1. We now show that each possible transmission tree is
produced by exactly one possible assignment of interior node hosts.
Let Cx denote the set of nodes in the phylogenetic clade rooted at node x, and let
Lx be the set of hosts of leaf nodes in Cx. If x is an interior node, host(x) may not be
in Lx. Let first(x) denote the individual in Lx who is infected earliest or has the earliest
onset of infectiousness, at least one of which is well-defined by Assumption 3. If the
individual infected earliest and the individual with the earliest onset of infectiousness
are different, either of them can be used as first(x). If x is a leaf, Cx = {x},
L(x) = {host(x)}, and first(x) = host(x).
Lemma 2. For any node x, host(x) = first(x) or host(x) infected first(x).
Proof. See S1 Appendix.
Theorem 2. A transmission tree corresponds to at most one possible assignment of
interior node hosts in a phylogeny.
Proof. See S1 Appendix.
Theorems 1 and 2 imply a one-to-one correspondence between the possible
transmission trees and the possible assignments of interior node hosts in a phylogeny.
Fig 1 illustrates this relationship in a very simple case. An similar result was proven
independently by Hall and Rambaut [49] using partitions of phylogenies.
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Sets of possible interior node hosts Theorems 1 and 2 reduce the problem of
finding the transmission trees consistent with a given phylogeny to that of finding the
possible assignments of interior node hosts. Let Hx denote the set of hosts h of node x
such that at least one possible transmission tree can be generated when host(x) = h.
There are two sets of constraints on Hx. The ancestors of x constrain the possible hosts
because of Lemma 1. The descendants of x constrain the possible hosts because host(x)
must be a common ancestor of all members of Lx in the transmission tree.
We deal first with the descendant constraints. A transmission tree within clade Cx is
a transmission tree rooted at host(x) that consists of host(x) and all members of Lx.
Let Dx denote the set of all hosts h such that at least one possible transmission tree
within Cx can be generated when host(x) = h. If x is a leaf, Dx = {host(x)} where
host(x) is the source of the pathogen sample whose genetic sequence is represented by x.
If x is an interior node, Dx can be calculated using the following results:
Lemma 3. If x is an interior node, host(x) = first(x) or host(x) = host
(
parent(x)
)
.
Proof. See S1 Appendix.
Lemma 4. If x is an interior node with child y in the phylogeny, then
host(x) ∈ D∗y =
{
Dy if first(y) 6∈ Dy,
Dy ∪ Vfirst(y) if first(y) ∈ Dy.
(9)
Proof. See S1 Appendix.
Theorem 3. For any interior node x in the phylogeny,
Dx =
⋂
y∈children(x)
D∗y, (10)
where children(x) denotes the children of x.
Proof. See S1 Appendix.
Now we consider the ancestral constraints on Hx. By assumption, host(r0) = 0. Let
Ar0 = {0}. For all other nodes in the phylogeny, let
Ax = Hparent(x) ∪ {first(x)}. (11)
Theorem 4. Hx = Ax ∩Dx.
Proof. See S1 Appendix.
Since Dx is known for each leaf x, Theorem 3 shows that Dx can be found for each
interior node x in a postorder (i.e., childen before parents) traversal of the phylogeny.
Since Ar0 = {0}, Theorem 4 shows that we can calculate Hx for each interior node x in
a preorder (parents before children) traversal of the phylogeny once all Dx are known.
Combining these results, we get Algorithm 1 for calculating all Hx in two traversals of
the phylogeny. We say that a phylogeny Φ is topologically consistent with the
epidemiologic data if Hx is nonempty for each interior node x of Φ.
Having found the Hx at each interior node x, it is possible to generate all possible
transmission trees consistent with the phylogeny and the epidemiologic data.
Theorem 5. Given a pathogen phylogeny Φ that is topologically consistent with the
epidemiologic data, a transmission tree v is possible if and only if it can be generated
using Algorithm 2.
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Input: Rooted phylogeny Φ and epidemiologic data
Output: Hx for each node x of Φ
for node x in postorder traversal of Φ do
if x is a leaf then Dx = {host(x)} else Dx = ∩y∈children(x)D∗y, where D∗y is
defined in equation (9)
end
for node x in preorder traversal of Φ do
if x = r0 then Hx = {0} else Hx = Dx ∩Ax, where
Ax = Hparent(x) ∪ {first(x)}
end
Algorithm 1: Finding host sets.
Input: Rooted phylogeny Φ with nonempty Hx for each node x
Output: Transmission tree v consistent with Φ and the epidemiologic data
for node x in preorder traversal of Φ do
if x = r0 then set host(x) = 0 else
w = parent(x);
choose host(x) ∈ Hx ∩ {host(w), first(x)};
if host(x) 6= host(w) then
add edge host(w)→ host(x) to v, adding node host(x) if necessary
end
end
end
Algorithm 2: Generating transmission trees.
Proof. See S1 Appendix.
Theorem 5 gives a useful indication of the value of a phylogeny. A bifurcating
phylogeny with n leaves has n− 1 interior nodes. For each interior node x, we have at
most 2 possible hosts given the host of parent(x). Thus, there are at most 2n−1 possible
transmission trees consistent with a pathogen phylogeny of n infections. Without a
phylogeny, the worst-case scenario is n! possible transmission trees. Using partitions,
Hall and Rambaut [49] independently proved that a phylogeny reduces the number of
possible transmission trees when n > 2.
The combination of Algorithms 1 and 2 is similar to a Sankoff parsimony [50] where
the states represent infected individuals and the cost of going from state i to state j is 1
if i ∈ Vj and ∞ otherwise. If there is a single exogenous infection, any transmission tree
consistent with the phylogeny and the epidemiologic data will have cost n− 1, and all
other transmission trees will have infinite cost. Compared to the more general context
of a Sankoff parsimony, our algorithms gain efficiency by not having to consider all
possible states at each internal node or calculate costs. They also have the advantage of
being based on explicit assumptions about the biology of infection and study design.
Host sets under a molecular clock Under a strict or relaxed molecular clock
model, each interior node of the phylogenetic tree can be assigned a branching time
based on its genetic distance to one or more sequences with known sampling times.
These branching times produce new opportunities for inconsistency between the
phylogenetic tree and the epidemic data, increasing the possible value of the phylogeny
for transmission parameter estimation. Let tx denote time assigned to node x in the
phylogeny. For each leaf, tx is the time at which the corresponding pathogen was
sampled. If x is an interior node, tx is a branching time.
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If host(x) is known, the branching time tx is subject to two constraints. Because
branching must occur after the infection of host(x) and before the end of his or her
infectious period,
tx ∈ (thost(x), thost(x) + εhost(x) + ιhost(x)], (12)
where a square bracket indicates an endpoint included in the interval and a parenthesis
indicates an endpoint excluded from the interval. We have tx > thost(x) because a
branching time in host(x) cannot occur until after he or she is infected. We have
tx ≤ thost(x) + εhost(x) + ιhost(x) because a descendant of virus x was transmitted to at
least one other host. The second constraint is that if x is a parent of y and
host(x) 6= host(y), then tx < thost(y) because a descendant of virus x infected host(y).
These constraints are sufficient to find a valid set of branching times given a possible
assignment of interior node hosts.
Theorem 6. If a transmission tree is generated using Algorithm 2, then Algorithm 3
assigns a valid branching time to each internal node of the phylogeny. Any assignment
of branching times consistent with the epidemiologic data can be generated this way.
Proof. See S1 Appendix.
Input: Rooted phylogeny Φ with known host(x) for each node x
Output: Branching time tx for each node x
for node x in postorder traversal of Φ do
if x is a leaf then set tx to be the time pathogen x was sampled else
tmax = miny∈children(x) ty;
choose tx ∈ (thost(x), tmax);
end
end
Algorithm 3: Assigning branching times.
Now suppose we have a phylogenetic tree with known branching times but unknown
interior node hosts. Let
H(t) = {i : ti < t ≤ ti + εi + ιi} (13)
be the set of individuals who are infected but not yet removed at time t, and let Hx(t)
be the set of possible hosts of node x when tx = t. To find Hx(tx), it is not sufficient to
calculate Hx using Algorithm 1 and then let Hx(tx) = Hx ∩H(tx). To see why, suppose
x and y are nodes in the phylogeny such that h ∈ Hx ∩Hy and h ∈ H(tx) ∩H(ty). Let
w be the MCRA of x and y. There is no guarantee that h ∈ Hw(tw). If not, h can be in
at most one of Hx(tx) and Hy(ty) by Lemma 1.
Algorithm 1 can be modified to find Hx(tx) with the following changes: In the
postorder traversal, we replace Dx with
Dx(tx) = H(tx) ∩
(
∩y∈children(x) D∗y
)
. (14)
In the preorder traversal, we define
Ax = Hparent(x)(tparent(x)) ∪ {first(x)} (15)
for all x 6= r0. Then Hx(tx) = Ax ∩Dx(tx). With these changes, the proofs of
Theorems 3 and 4 in S1 Appendix work as before under the additional constraint that
host(x) ∈ H(tx) for all nodes x in the phylogeny.
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Simulations
To study the impact of a phylogeny on the efficiency of transmission parameter
estimates, we conducted a series of 1,000 simulations. In each simulation, there were 100
independent households of size 6. Each household had an index case with an infection
time chosen from an exponential distribution with mean one. Each individual i had a
binary covariate Xi that could affect infectiousness and susceptibility. Given a
parameter vector β = (βinf, βsus), the hazard of infectious contact from i to j at
infectious age τ of i is
hij(τ,β) = exp(βinfXi + βsusXj)λ0. (16)
In each simulation, βinf and βsus were independently chosen from a uniform distribution
on (−1, 1). In all simulations, the baseline hazard was λ0 = 1 and the infectious periods
were independent exponential random variables with mean one.
In each simulation, we analyzed data from the first 200 infections in three ways:
using only epidemiologic data via the likelihood in equation (5), using epidemiologic
data with who-infected-whom via the likelihood in equation (4), and using
epidemiologic data with a phylogeny via the likelihood in equation (7). In the
phylogenetic analysis, we assumed a single pathogen sample from each infected
individual. The within-host phylogeny for each individual who infected m > 0
individuals was chosen uniformly at random from all rooted, bifurcating phylogenies
with m+ 1 tips. Within-individual phylogenies were chosen independently and
combined into a single phylogeny as in Ypma et al. [40]. Thus, the conditional
probability Pr(Φ|v, Epi) for a phylogeny Φ given a transmission tree v in which each
individual j infected mj ≥ 0 other individuals was proportional to∏
j:mj>0
2mj−1(mj − 1)!
(2mj − 1)! . (17)
The set of transmission trees consistent with the phylogeny was determined using
Algorithms 1 and 2. We calculated the mean error, mean squared error, 95% confidence
interval coverage probability, and relative efficiency of βinf, βsus, and lnλ0 estimates in
all three analyses.
The simulations were conducted in Python 2.7 (www.python.org) and analysis was
conducted in R 3.2 (cran.r-project.org) via RPy2 2.7 (rpy.sourceforge.net). The
Python code is in S1 Text. Parameters, point estimates, and 95% confidence limits are
in S1 Data. R code for the simulation data analysis is in S2 Text.
Data on individuals who escape infection The likelihoods in equations (4)
and (5) require data on individuals who were at risk of infection but not infected.
Except for Lau et al. [43], these data are not used in any of the studies cited in the
Introduction. To study the value of data on individuals who escape infection in the
households of infected individuals, we repeated all analyses excluding data on the
uninfected. The parameters, point estimates, and 95% confidence limits are in S2 Data.
Time variation in infectiousness When contact intervals are exponential and
there is no variation in infectiousness, the transmission tree is an ancillary statistic for
the hazard λ of infectious contact [44]. To explore the effect of time variation in
infectiousness on the value of a phylogeny, we repeated the simulations using a Weibull
contact interval distribution with shape parameter γ = 0.5. To keep the same mean
contact interval, we set the rate parameter λ0 = 2. The hazard of infectious contact
from i to j at infectious age τ or i is
hij(τ,β) = exp(βinfXi + βsusXj)γλ
γ
0τ
γ−1. (18)
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With γ = 0.5, this decreases monotonically during the infectious period. These
simulations used the same combinations of (βinf, βsus) that were used in the simulations
with exponential contact intervals. The parameters, point estimates, and 95%
confidence limits are in S3 Data.
Data analysis
To illustrate an application of these algorithms and likelihoods, we use them to analyze
farm-to-farm transmission trees of foot and mouth disease virus (FMDV) in a cluster of
12 epidemiologically linked farms in Durham, UK in 2001. The genetic and
epidemiologic data are publicly available as Data S3 and Data S4 in Morelli et al. [29].
These data were previously analyzed by Cottam et al. [31, 32], Morelli et al. [29],
Ypma et al. [40], and Lau et al. [43].
FMDV is a picornavirus that causes a highly contagious disease in cattle, pigs, sheep,
and goats [51]. Upon infection, there is an incubation period of approximately 1–12 days
in sheep, 2–14 days in cattle, and two or more days in pigs. The incubation period is
followed by an acute febrile illness with painful blisters on the feet, the mouth, and the
mammary glands. It is transmitted through secretions from infected animals, fomites,
virus carried on skin or clothing, and aerosolized virus. Outbreaks of foot-and-mouth
disease are difficult to control and can devastate livestock. During the FMDV outbreak,
teams from the UK Department for Environment, Food, and Rural Affairs (DEFRA)
visited each infected farm [30,31]. They recorded the number and types of susceptible
and infected animals, examined infected animals to determine the age of the oldest
lesions, and collected epithelial samples. Finally, they recorded the date of the cull.
We assume that infectiousness begins on the day that the first lesions appeared and
ends with the cull, and we assumed a latent period (between infection and the onset of
infectiousness) of 2–16 days. Fig 2 shows the relative locations of the farms, and Fig 3
shows the timeline of the latent and infectious periods. Analysis was conducted in R 3.2
(cran.r-project.org), and the code is available in S3 Text.
Estimating the hazard of infectious contact Without a phylogeny, we estimated
the hazard of transmission from an infected farm to a susceptible farm using the
likelihood in equation (5). We assumed a log-logistic contact interval distribution with
rate parameter λ and shape parameter γ, which has the hazard function
h(τ, λ, γ) =
γλγτγ−1
1 + (λτ)γ
(19)
and the survival function S(τ, λ, γ) =
(
1 + (λτ)γ
)−1
where τ is the infectious age. This
is the simplest parametric model in survival analysis that allows a non-monotonic
hazard function. When γ ≤ 1, the hazard decreases monotonically. When γ > 1, the
hazard is unimodal. To enforce the restriction that λ > 0 and γ > 0, maximum
likelihood estimation was done using parameters lnλ and ln γ.
If farm j is infected on day t, let Vj(t) denote its infectious set and Wj(t) denote its
exposure set. For each i ∈ Vj(t), the times ti + εi of onset of infectiousness and t∗j of
onset of symptoms are known. Without a phylogeny, the overall likelihood contribution
for each infected farm j except K (the index farm) is the sum of the likelihood in
equation (5) over all possible infection times:
t∗j−2∑
t=t∗j−16
[ ∑
i∈Vj(t)
h
(
t− ti − εi, λ, γ
) ∏
i∈Wj(t)
S
(
min(ιi, t− ti − εi), λ, γ
)]
. (20)
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Figure 2. Relative locations of the 12 farms in the Durham cluster. These
were infected in the 2001 FMDV outbreak in the UK.
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Figure 3. Timeline of latent and infectious periods in the Durham cluster.
The gray bars represent the range of days on which each farm might have been infected.
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Note that the sum of the hazards is zero for each t where there is no possible infector.
Via a sum-product factorization, the product of equation (20) over all j 6= L is the sum
of the likelihoods of all possible combinations of infection times at the farms.
With a phylogeny, we estimated the hazard of transmission from an infected farm to
a susceptible farm using the likelihood in equation (7), which is a weighted sum of the
likelihood contributions of each transmission tree. Let I denote the set of endogenously
infected farms. For each transmission tree v, the likelihood is
∏
j∈I
[ t∗j−2∑
t=t∗j−16
h
(
t− tvj − εvj , λ, γ
) ∏
i∈Wj(t)
S
(
min(ιi, t− ti − εi), λ, γ
)]
(21)
where vj denotes the infector of farm j. We assumed that the within-host phylogeny for
each farm that infected m > 0 other farms was chosen uniformly at random from all
rooted, bifurcating phylogenies with m+ 1 tips, so each transmission tree gets a weight
proportional to equation (17).
Data on farms that escaped infection As usual, the epidemiologic data set
contains only infected farms. To illustrate how our results depend on farms that
escaped infection, we repeat the analyses with and without a phylogeny using 6, 12, and
24 uninfected farms. Because observation of the outbreak ended after the end of
infectiousness in all infected farms, the likelihood contribution from each uninfected
farm is
∏
i∈W∗ S(ιi, λ, γ) where W∗ is the set of infected farms and ιi is the infectious
period for farm i.
Results
Simulations
Table 1 shows the mean error, mean squared error, 95% confidence interval coverage
probability, and relative efficiency of βinf, βsus, and lnλ0 estimators in the simulations.
In all cases, the point estimates were nearly unbiased (indicated by the mean error
squared being much smaller than the mean squared error) and the 95% confidence
interval coverage probabilities were near 0.95. Fig 4 shows that estimates of βinf using a
phylogeny were more efficient than estimates using epidemiologic data only and less
efficient than estimates using who-infected-whom. By mean squared error, the
phylogenetic estimates had a relative efficiency of 1.39 compared to estimates using only
epidemiologic data and 0.80 compared to estimates using who-infected-whom. Because
knowledge of who-infected-whom does not add to our knowledge of who was infected, all
three analyses were equally efficient for βsus (similar results were obtained for estimates
with and without who-infected-whom in Ref [46]). Fig 5 shows that estimates of lnλ0
using a phylogeny were more efficient than those using epidemiologic data only and less
efficient than those using who-infected whom. By mean squared error, the phylogenetic
estimates had a relative efficiency of 1.17 compared to estimates using only
epidemiologic data and 0.90 compared to estimates using who-infected-whom.
Table 2 shows the mean error, mean squared error, 95% confidence interval coverage
probability, and relative efficiency of βinf, βsus, and lnλ0 estimators that excluded data
on uninfected household members. The mean squared errors were much higher than the
corresponding estimators in Table 1, so their relative efficiency was very low. In all cases,
the efficiency loss from excluding data on individuals who escape infection was much
larger than the efficiency gain from incorporating a phylogeny or from knowing exactly
who infected whom. For estimators of βinf and βsus, the square of the mean error was
much smaller than the mean squared error, indicating little bias. Estimates of lnλ0 were
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Table 1. Statistical performance of estimators under exponential contact intervals.
Epidemiologic
only + phylogeny + who-infected-whom
βinf
Mean error 0.0032 0.0060 0.0080
Mean squared error 0.0537 0.0386 0.0307
Coverage probability 0.945 0.942 0.945
Relative efficiency∗ 1 1.39 1.75
βsus
Mean error 0.0023 0.0025 0.0023
Mean squared error 0.0306 0.0306 0.0305
Coverage probability 0.953 0.953 0.953
Relative efficiency∗ 1 1.00 1.00
lnλ0
Mean error -0.0050 -0.0054 -0.0057
Mean squared error 0.0300 0.0256 0.0230
Coverage probability 0.952 0.953 0.955
Relative efficiency∗ 1 1.17 1.31
* Compared to estimates with epidemiologic data only.
biased upward, resulting in extremely low relative efficiencies and coverage probabilities.
In Ref [44], similar results were seen for estimates of the basic reproduction number
(R0) when approximate likelihoods for mass-action models, which do not require data
on uninfected individuals, were used to analyze data from network-based epidemics.
Table 3 shows results the mean error, mean squared error, 95% confidence interval
coverage probability, and relative efficiency of βinf, βsus, lnλ0, and ln γ estimators from
models with Weibull contact interval distributions with rate parameter λ0 = 2 and
shape parameter γ = .5. All estimators are unbiased with 95% confidence interval
coverage probabilities near 0.95. The relative efficiencies are similar to those in Table 1,
showing that the gains in efficiency for estimates of infectiousness hazard ratios and
baseline hazards occur under weak assumptions about the baseline hazard.
Data Analysis
With no phylogeny, there are 19,440 possible transmission trees linking the 12 farms in
the Durham cluster. A phylogeny was constructed in SeaView [52] using consensus
RNA sequences from 15 farms, including three farms not epidemiologically linked to the
cluster [29]. We used a generalized time reversible (GTR) nucleotide substitution model
with four rate classes on 8, 196 sites. Fig 6 shows the rooted phylogeny for the 12 farms
in the cluster with branch tips scaled to reflect the time of infectiousness onset at each
farm (interior branch lengths do not indicate branching times). The order of
infectiousness onsets is known, so first(x) is the host with the earliest onset of
infectiousness in clade Cx. Fig 7 shows the postorder host set Dx for each node x in the
phylogeny, and Fig 8 shows the host sets. The host is uniquely determined by the
phylogeny for all interior nodes except three. Figure 9 shows the six possible interior
node host assignments and the corresponding transmission trees.
Hazard of infectious contact Tab. 4 shows the rate and shape parameter estimates
with and without a phylogeny for 0, 6, 12, and 24 uninfected farms. The estimates with
a phylogeny have lower rate and shape parameters, suggesting a slightly more rapid
increase in infectiousness with a lower peak. The estimates using a phylogeny have
narrower confidence intervals. The predicted hazard functions are shown in Fig 10, and
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Table 2. Statistical performance of estimators using infecteds only.
Epidemiologic
data + phylogeny + who-infected-whom
βinf
Mean error 0.0300 0.0312 0.0299
Mean squared error 0.1850 0.1115 0.0804
Coverage probability 0.682 0.756 0.779
Relative efficiency∗ 0.29 0.48 0.67
βsus
Mean error 0.0408 0.0410 0.0261
Mean squared error 0.1351 0.1339 0.1842
Coverage probability 0.583 0.582 0.491
Relative efficiency∗ 0.23 0.23 0.17
lnλ0
Mean error 0.7647 0.7559 0.9341
Mean squared error 0.6151 0.5978 0.9033
Coverage probability 0.008 0.007 0.000
Relative efficiency∗ 0.05 0.05 0.03
* Compared to estimates in Table 1 with epidemiologic data only.
Table 3. Statistical performance of estimators under Weibull contact intervals.
Epidemiologic
data + phylogeny + who-infected-whom
βinf
Mean error 0.0030 0.0043 0.0000
Mean squared error 0.0454 0.0318 0.0251
Coverage probability 0.948 0.960 0.966
Relative efficiency∗ 1 1.43 1.81
βsus
Mean error -0.0076 -0.0076 -0.0075
Mean squared error 0.0278 0.0276 0.0276
Coverage probability 0.949 0.949 0.946
Relative efficiency∗ 1 1.01 1.01
lnλ0
Mean error 0.0278 0.0224 0.0260
Mean squared error 0.1188 0.1069 0.0978
Coverage probability 0.941 0.948 0.943
Relative efficiency∗ 1 1.11 1.21
ln γ
Mean error 0.0133 0.0114 0.0106
Mean squared error 0.0052 0.0046 0.0045
Coverage probability 0.958 0.961 0.960
Relative efficiency∗ 1 1.12 1.15
* Compared to estimates using epidemiologic data only.
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Figure 4. Relative efficiencies of βinf estimates based on squared widths of
confidence intervals. The dashed and dotted lines are smoothed means.
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Figure 5. Relative efficiencies of lnλ0 estimates based on squared widths of
confidence intervals. The dashed and dotted lines are smoothed means.
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Figure 6. First hosts in the Durham cluster. Rooted phylogeny for RNA
sequences from the 12 farms in the Durham cluster with tips at the onset of
infectiousness. Each interior node x has first(x) written next to it.
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Figure 7. Postorder host sets in the Durham cluster. The postorder host set
Dx is written next to each interior node x. These are calculated in a postorder traversal
using the leaf hosts and the infectious sets.
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Figure 8. Host sets in the Durham cluster. The host set Hx is written next to
each interior node x. These are calculated in a preorder traversal using the root host
and the postorder host sets.
they are very sensitive to the number of farms that escaped infection. A similar
sensitivity was observed by Lau et al. [43], who estimated 300 uninfected farms based
on the crude density of farms in Durham County.
To understand the effect of the phylogenies on the precision of the hazard function
estimates, we constructed approximate pointwise 95% confidence bands for the hazard
functions estimated with no uninfected farms. We took 4000 samples from each
likelihood using a grid with spacing 0.02 on the interval [−3.6,−1.3] for lnλ and
[−0.5, 1.8] for ln γ. These intervals include the 99% confidence limits for both estimates
plus a boundary of width 0.2. For each sample, we calculated the hazard function at
500 time points between 0 and 15. At each time point, we took the .025 and .975
quantiles of the calculated hazards to get an approximate 95% confidence interval.
Fig 11 shows that the confidence bands for the estimates with phylogenies are narrower.
Similar results were obtained when parameters were sampled from their approximate
multivariate normal distributions, which can be done using S3 Text.
Discussion
Here we took a single phylogeny, derived the set of possible transmission trees, and
estimated transmission parameters using likelihoods that are sums over the possible
transmission trees. By restricting the set of possible transmission trees, incorporating a
phylogeny into the analysis produced more efficient estimates of infectiousness hazard
ratios and the baseline hazard of infectious contact. The efficiency gain was largest for
infectiousness hazard ratio estimates. The combination of survival analysis and
algorithms linking phylogenies to transmission trees can be incorporated into analyses
based on many different statistical and phylogenetic methods. More precise estimates of
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Figure 9. Interior node host assignments (left) and transmission trees
(right) consistent with the phylogeny and the epidemiologic data. Dashed
lines on the right indicate transmissions fixed by the phylogeny to the left. Dotted lines
indicate that the infector of an individual depends on a choice of hosts in the phylogeny.
At the top, K infects C, C infects P , and either K or L infects E. At the bottom, O
infects C, either O or C infects P , and either K or L infects E. There are six possible
transmission trees—two on top and four on the bottom.
Table 4. Log-logistic rate and shape parameter estimates.
Uninfected Without phylogeny With phylogeny
farms Point estimate (95% CI) Point estimate (95% CI)
0
rate (λ) 0.132 (0.062, 0.180) 0.125 (0.060, 0.175)
shape (γ) 2.486 (1.131, 4.748) 2.233 (1.158, 3.807)
6
rate (λ) 0.068 (0.018, 0.110) 0.062 (0.018, 0.103)
shape (γ) 1.972 (0.946, 3.605) 1.812 (0.966, 2.979)
12
rate (λ) 0.049 (0.010, 0.089) 0.043 (0.010, 0.080)
shape (γ) 1.878 (0.907, 3.413) 1.725 (0.924, 2.823)
24
rate (λ) 0.034 (0.005, 0.070) 0.029 (0.005, 0.061)
shape (γ) 1.815 (0.881, 3.289) 1.666 (0.894, 2.720)
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Figure 10. Predicted farm-to-farm infectiousness with (black) and without
(gray) phylogenies. These are log-logistic hazard functions based on the rate and
shape parameters estimates in Table 4.
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transmission parameters, not the transmission trees themselves, will inform public
health responses to emerging infections.
We assumed complete observation of infection times, latent periods, and infectious
periods, so our methods need to be extended to account for missing data and
phylogenetic uncertainty. Bayesian MCMC with data augmentation is a well-established
method of handling missing data in infectious disease epidemiology [53]. Combining this
with a Bayesian MCMC for phylogeny reconstruction would allow our likelihoods to be
integrated over both missing data and phylogenetic uncertainty [54]. Standard
phylogenetic reconstruction assumes a well-mixed population, which may not be a good
approximation for pathogen populations partitioned among hosts, but Bayesian
methods can reconcile the reconstruction of phylogenies with possible transmission
trees [49]. Extending these methods to nonparametric or semiparametric models of
disease transmission will require iterative approaches to the assignment of probabilities
to possible transmission trees [45,46].
Our methods can be extended to diseases with complex within-host and
between-host dynamics by adapting the likelihood in equation (7) or the algorithms
linking phylogenies to transmission trees. For example, Assumption 2 requires a strict
transmission bottleneck. If multiple pathogen lineages can be transmitted when a new
host is infected at time t, sequences sampled from the infectee could have an MRCA
with a branching time before t. The nodes hosted by the infectee would no longer form
a subtree of the phylogeny. This is similar to deep coalescence (lineage sorting), which
causes gene trees and species trees to have different topologies. Deep coalescence would
be most likely to occur in a disease with a wide transmission bottleneck, substantial
within-host diversity, and little within-host evolution [55]. Algorithm 1 could be
adapted by allowing the infector of an i ∈ Vj to be the host of an interior node of the
phylogeny whose child is hosted by j. The likelihood in equation (7) would have to
include the likelihood contributions of these additional host assignments, including the
within-host pathogen dynamics allowing two parallel strains to pass through i to j.
Simulations The simulations suggest that a phylogeny can recover much of the
information that would be obtained by observing who-infected-whom. Incorporating a
phylogeny generated more precise estimates of βinf and lnλ0. This increase in efficiency
remained when infectiousness varied over the course of the infectious period, as in the
Weibull models. The simulations used only phylogenetic topologies and assumed that all
within-host topologies were equally likely, limiting the ability of the phylogeny to
constrain the set of possible transmission trees. Using branching times and more
realistic models of within-host pathogen evolution would allow greater information
about who-infected-whom to be extracted from a phylogeny.
The simulations that excluded data on household members who escape infection
showed that this information is critical to estimating βinf, βsus, and lnλ0 accurately.
These individuals do not appear anywhere on the pathogen phylogeny, so this point has
escaped the attention of many researchers working on incorporating phylogenetics into
the analysis of infectious disease transmission data. Any analysis that excludes this data
should have an explicit justification based on a complete-data model—for example, the
initial spread of a mass-action epidemic can be analyzed without data on escapees [44].
In general, epidemiologic studies of emerging infections should be designed to capture
information on individuals who were exposed to infection but not infected, which might
justify greater emphasis on detailed studies of households, schools, or other settings
with rapid transmission and a clearly defined population at risk.
Data analysis The data analysis showed that the increased precision found in the
simulations can be obtained in practice. The incorporation of phylogenies allowed more
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precise estimates of the hazard of FMDV transmission from infected to susceptible
farms. For simplicity, our analysis assumed that the times of infectiousness onset were
accurately estimated. A data-augmented MCMC [53] could be used to account for
uncertainty in the onset of infectiousness, showing the importance of extending our
methods to account for missing data.
A more important limitation of this analysis was the lack of data on uninfected
farms. The hazard function estimates were highly sensitive to the number of uninfected
farms in the area where the cluster occurred. These data often go uncollected in
outbreaks because their importance is unrecognized. This insight has important
implications for the theory and practice of molecular infectious disease epidemiology.
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